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Abstract. Simple games are a powerful tool to analyze decision-making and coalition formation in social
and political life. In this paper, we present relation-algebraic models of simple games and develop relational
algorithms for solving some basic problems of them. In particular, we test certain fundamental properties
of simple games (being monotone, proper, respectively strong) and compute speciﬁc players (dummies, dic-
tators, vetoers, null players) and coalitions (minimal winning coalitions and vulnerable winning coalitions).
We also apply relation-algebra to determine central and dominant players, swingers and power indices (the
Banzhaf, Holler-Packel and Deegan-Packel indices). This leads to relation-algebraic speciﬁcations, which
can be executed with the help of the BDD-based tool RelView after a simple translation into the tool’s
programming language. In order to demonstrate the visualization facilities of RelView we consider an
example of the Catalonian Parliament after the 2003 election.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C71, C88, C63, C65, D72
Keywords: relation algebra, RelView, simple game, winning coalition, swinger, dominant
player, central player, power index
1 Introduction
A simple game is a cooperative game in which only two types of coalitions can be formed, to
wit, winning coalitions and losing ones. A winning coalition takes it all while a losing coalition
receives nothing. Since winning seems to be the essence of politics, simple games are extremely
suitable for analyzing political situations. A particular case of a winning coalition is a minimal
winning coalition in which every member is needed to make it winning. In other words, the
removal of any of its members will make it a losing coalition. A particular case of a losing
coalition is a blocking coalition whose complement is also losing. Although a blocking coalition
cannot enforce a decision, it can prevent the enforcement of any decision.
Important concepts in the theory of simple games are the concepts of swinger, veto-player,
dictator, and dummy. A swinger of a winning coalition is a member of the coalition whose
removal makes the coalition losing. A veto-player is a player who is in every minimal winning
coalition. Under the monotonicity assumption, a veto-player must be in every winning coalition,
and hence no coalition can win without a veto-player. A simple game is weak if it contains a
veto-player. If one player forms the only minimal winning coalition, then this player is called
a dictator. There is obviously an essential di erence between a veto-player and a dictator. A
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92 Rudolf Berghammer, Agnieszka Rusinowska, and Harrie de Swart
dictator can win on his own, he can enforce any decision without help of the other players. In
contrast, a veto-player is needed to win, but cannot win on his own. He only can block the
decision-making process, not enforce a decision. A dummy is a player who is a member of no
minimal winning coalition. A dummy is a powerless player. It cannot make a winning coalition
losing or a losing coalition winning.
Apart from deﬁning simple games as those in which each coalition either wins or loses,
see, e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, [28]), Shapley and Shubik (1954, [42]), Peleg
and Sudh¨ olter (2003, [32]), some scholars considered combining simple games into one game
or decomposing a game into components. O’Neill and Peleg (2008, [29]), for instance, study
several types of composition rules (e.g., the lexicographic, projection, veto, and product rules)
to combine two proper games into one proper game, where the success of a coalition depends
on whether it wins, blocks, or loses in each component.
When studying coalition formation, one of the most important issues is to identify some
key players in the game. Several concepts of such speciﬁc players have been developed in the
literature. In Peleg (1981, [31]) a theory of coalition formation in simple games with dominant
players has been developed. Roughly speaking, a dominant player in a simple game is a player
who holds a strict majority within a winning coalition; see also Peleg (1981, [31]). The dominant
player is a ‘policy blind’ or ‘o ce seeking’ concept. The dominant players are the most powerful
players of a game. Such players neither must exist nor must be unique. However, Peleg proved
that in weak simple games and weighted majority games at most one dominant player may
occur. Games with dominant players are called dominated. For further discussions, see, e.g.,
Peleg (1981, [31]), van Deemen (1989, [12]) and van Roozendaal (1990, [34]).
Another interesting concept is the concept of a central player introduced in Einy (1985,
[16]). In contrast to the dominant player, the central player is a ‘policy oriented’ or ‘policy
seeking’ concept. It is not hard to prove that there exists at most one central player in a
simple game. In order to ﬁnd the central player of a game, the players must be ordered on
a relevant policy dimension, and the particular position of the central player makes him very
powerful. A simple game in which a central player exists is called centralized. An empirical
analysis of the importance and e ect of dominant and central parties on cabinets in Western
multiparty democracies has been examined e.g., in van Roozendaal (1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1997,
[35, 36, 37, 38]). In van Roozendaal (1997, [38]), for instance, the author argues that there
are certain theoretical reasons by which governments including dominant parties should be
more stable than governments without dominant parties. Moreover, van Roozendaal shows,
by analyzing government survival in 12 countries between 1945 and 1989, that such an e ect
indeed exists in real politics. Furthermore, in van Roozendaal (1993, [37]), the importance of
the central player in Dutch cabinets has been shown.
Relatively simple examples of problems in the ﬁeld of simple games are frequently already
too complicated to be solved by hand. Therefore, it is useful to have computer programs avail-
able to deal with such problems. But because many problems appearing with simple games
are intractable in terms of complexity theory, for instance, #P-complete or NP-hard, even a
computer program may not be able to deal with somewhat larger examples.
One usually does not immediately think of computer programs based on relation-algebraic
formulations of the concepts in question. However, since some decades relation algebra is used
successfully for formal problem speciﬁcation, prototyping, and algorithm development. See e.g.,








































9Relation Algebra and Simple Games 3
Relations are well suited for modeling and reasoning about many discrete structures (like graphs,
hypergraphs, Petri nets, orders, lattices) and, due to the easy mechanization (using, for instance,
Boolean matrices) also for computations on them.
RelView is a visual computer system for the visualization and manipulation of relations
and for relational prototyping and programming. The tool is written in the C programming
language and makes full use of the X-windows graphical user interface. Among the advantages
of RelView are, for instance, short and concise programs which frequently consist of only a
few lines expressing the relation-algebraic expression of the notions in question. For details and
applications, see e.g., Berghammer et al. (1996, [5]), Behnke et al. (1998, [3]), Berghammer et
al. (2003, [9]), Berghammer and Milanese (2006, [7]), Berghammer and Fronk (2006, [4]) and
Berghammer et al. (2009, [8]). One of the aims of this paper is to apply the relation-algebraic
approach to the key concepts deﬁned in the domain of simple games. Taking into account that
all these concepts are important both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view, the
application of the relation-algebraic approach, on the one hand being a mathematical formal
approach and on the other hand giving an immediate access to the RelView implementation,
is very useful. Because the RelView tool has a very e cient BDD (Binary Decision Diagram)
implementation of relations, developed in the course of the Ph.D. theses Leoniuk (2001, [25])
and Milanese (2003, [27]) and shortly described in Berghammer et al. (2002, [6]), it is able to
deal with non-trivial simple games that appear, e.g., in practical political life. In addition, this
tool allows animations and has visualization facilities in the form of matrices and graphs, which
are not easily found in other software tools and which are most helpful for fully comprehending
di cult concepts and for understanding and testing the programs.
One of the most important elements of simple games is to measure power of players. To this
end, during the last decades some so-called power indices have been proposed, e.g., the Shapley-
Shubik index by Shapley and Shubik (1954, [42]), the Banzhaf index by Banzhaf (1965, [2]),
the Deegan-Packel index by Deegan and Packel (1978, [11]), the Johnston index by (Johnston,
1978, [21]) and the Holler-Packel index by Holler (1982, [19]) and Holler and Packel (1983,
[20]), They are based on di erent models for power and, therefore, their use and informative
value depends on the context in which they are applied. Axiomatic characterizations, as, e.g.,
presented in Dubey (1975, [13]), Dubey and Shapley (1979, [15]), Lehrer (1988, [24]), Laruelle
and Valenciano (2001, [23]), Dubey et al. (2005, [14]), Lorenzo-Freire et al. (2007, [26]) and
Alonso-Meijide et al. (2008, [1]) are helpful for the appraisal of their applicability. For an
extensive analysis of most of the power indices see, e.g., Owen (1995, [30]) and Felsenthal and
Machover (1998, [17]).
Although power indices have been studied in detail in the voting power literature, usually
the standard approach has been applied to analyze them. It is useful, however, to apply other
(interdisciplinary) approaches to power indices. One such very interesting application is pre-
sented in Saari and Sieberg (2000, [39]), where the authors use linear algebra and geometry
to show and explain some surprising properties of power indices related to di erent rankings
obtained by di erent power indices. In this article we present an application of another ﬁeld of
mathematics (viz. relation algebra) to power indices. Measuring power is of importance and can
be applied to all kinds of organizations, for example, to political bodies, international economic
organizations, and to business settings. Hence, our relation-algebraic approach to voting power
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the main game-theoretic
concepts that we deal with in the paper are presented. In Section 3 we start with a brief
introduction to relation algebra and present a few relation algebraic constructions which are
used later in the paper. The core of the paper is Section 4. Here we start in the ﬁrst subsection
with two relation algebraic models of simple games, show how they can be transformed into
each other and we give relation-algebraic characterizations of monotone simple games, of proper
and of strong simple games. Thereby, the visualization facilities of RelView are demonstrated
in the case of the parliament of Catalonia after the 2003 election. In the next subsection we
give the relation-algebraic expressions for the set of minimal winning coalitions, of the notion of
being a swinger in a given coalition and of the notion of vulnerable winning coalition. We also
give relation-algebraic formulations for the sets of dummies, vetoers, dictators and null players,
respectively. Again, these notions are illustrated in the case of the Catalonian parliament by
running RelView programs based on the respective algebraic expressions. The third subsection
is devoted to the development of relation-algebraic expressions for the set of central players
and for notions around dominant players. The RelView tool enables us to show the Hasse-
diagram of the more-desirable relation between coalitions in the parliament of Catalonia after
the 2003 election. In the ﬁnal subsection we deﬁne the Banzhaf, the Holler-Packel and the
Deegan-Packel power indices in terms of relation algebra and again demonstrate the ability of
the RelView tool to compute these indices for the Catalonian parliament. Some concluding
remarks are presented in Section 5.
2 Game-theoretic Preliminaries
In this section we present some basic concepts of the theory of simple games that we refer to in
the paper. More extensive treatments of simple games can be found, for instance, in Shapley
(1962, [41]), Owen (1995, [30]), Felsenthal and Machover (1998, [17]) and Peleg and Sudh¨ olter
(2003, [32]).
2.1 Simple Games
Following Peleg and Sudh¨ olter (2003, [32]), a simple game is a pair (N,W), where N =
{1,2,...,n} denotes the set of players and W is a subset of the powerset 2N. Any element
of 2N is called a coalition. A coalition S with S  W is called winning, while those with S/  W
are called losing. A simple game (N,W) is called monotone if W is an up-set in the order
(2N, ), i.e., for all S,T   2N from S  W and S   T it follows T  W.Avoting game is a
monotone simple game (N,W) with W =   and   /  W. The latter two axioms exclude trivial
games. A simple game is proper if the complement of a winning coalition is always losing, and
strong if the complement of any losing coalition is winning. A simple game is decisive if it is
both proper and strong. In the context of voting games, for instance, being proper is interesting
since it is equivalent to the fact that any pair of winning coalitions has a player in common
and being strong is interesting since here no blocking coalitions can occur, i.e., coalitions S such
that S and S are losing.
An important class of games are weighted majority games. They are omnipresent, in par-








































9Relation Algebra and Simple Games 5
unequal power. Usually, a weighted majority game with n players is represented by a n+1-tuple
[q;w1,w 2,...,wn], (1)
where q   N denotes the quota needed for a coalition to win, and wk   N is the weight assigned
to player k   N. By w(S)=
 
k S wk we deﬁne the weight of a coalition S. A coalition S is
then winning if its weight is at least as large as q, that is, S  W if and only if w(S)   q.
2.2 Minimal Winning Coalitions and Related Notions
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, [28]) introduced the concept of a minimal winning
coalition of a simple game (N,W), that is a coalition S  W such that T/  W for all coalitions
T   S. Less restrictive is the notion of a vulnerable winning coalition S. Here, besides S  W,
it is demanded that there exists a player k   S such that T/  W for all T   S \{ k}. In
case of a monotone game the latter property is equivalent to the existence of k   S such that
S \{ k} /  W. Such a player k   S is called a swinger (or critical player) of S. These concepts
are, e.g., of importance when measuring the power of players.
Apart from swingers, one can distinguish other speciﬁc players in a simple game, depending
on their relation to minimal winning coalitions. Let (N,W) be a simple game and k   N. Then
k is called a dummy if it does not belong to a minimal winning coalition, a vetoer if it is a
member of each minimal winning coalition, and a dictator if {k} is the only minimal winning
coalition. Finally, k is a null player if for each coalition S   2N it holds S  {k}   W if and
only if S  W.
2.3 Central and Dominant Players
As already mentioned in the introduction, the concept of a central player has been introduced
in Einy (1985, [16]). Here it is assumed that the players of the game under consideration are
ordered with respect to their policy positions. In political science one usually uses a left-to-right
spectrum and the most important case is that the parties are ordered according to their stands
in social and economic matters.
Given a simple game (N,W) and a policy order of the players in the form of a linear strict
order relation P : N  N, i.e., a relation for which P   I (irreﬂexivity), PP   P (transitivity)
and P   P T = I (linearity) hold, player k   N is said to be central if the connected coalition
{j   N : Pj,k} to the ‘left’ of k as well as the connected coalition {j   N : Pk,j} to the ‘right’
of k are not winning, but both can be turned into winning coalitions when k joins them.
Based on two desirability-relationships between coalitions, in Perleg (1981, [31]) the concept
of dominance and dominant players is developed. Let (N,W) be a simple game, S,T   2N be
coalitions and k   N be a player. Then S is called as least as desirable as T, written as S  D T,
if for all U   2N from U  S =  , U  T =   and U  T  W it follows U  S  W. S is said to
be more desirable than T, written as S> D T, if S  D T but not T  D S. Finally, k dominates
S, written as k   S, if k   S and {k} >D S \{ k}, and k is dominant if there exists a S  W
such that k   S. If k dominates S, then k can form a winning coalition with players outside
of S while S \{ k} is not able to do this. The dominant players are the most powerful players
of the game. Such players neither must exist nor must be unique. However, Peleg proved that
in weak simple games and weighted majority games at most one dominant player may occur.
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2.4 Power Indices
In this section we recapitulate power indices that we deal with in the paper. One of the main
power indices that can be found in the literature is the Banzhaf index (Banzhaf, 1965, [2]).
Let a monotone simple game (N,W) and a player k   N be given. Then the absolute Banzhaf
index B (k) of k and the normalized Banzhaf index B(k) of k are deﬁned as follows, where n
is the number of players:
B(k) :=
|{S   W | k swinger of S}|





Another well-known power index that we study in the paper is the Holler-Packel index
of Holler (1982, [19]) and Holler and Packel (1983, [20]). Since a minimal winning coalition
S coincides with the set of its swingers, the absolute Holler-Packel index H(k) of k can be
speciﬁed in a way very similar to the deﬁnition of B(k) in (2). Compared with the deﬁnition of
B(k), only in the numerator the set W is to be replaced by the set Wmin of minimal winning
coalitions and the denominator is to be changed to |Wmin|. The deﬁnition of the normalized
Holler-Packel index exactly corresponds to the deﬁnition of B via B in (2). Hence, we have:
H(k) :=







A power index that is related to minimal winning coalitions is also the Deegan-Packel index
of Deegan and Packel (1978, [11]). Given a monotone simple game (N,W) with set Wmin of
minimal winning coalitions, the Deegan-Packel index D(k) assigns to each player k   N the
following number, where the set W
(k)
min denotes the set of all minimal winning coalitions of the











All the concepts introduced in the literature of simple games and recapitulated in this section
will be deﬁned again in Section 4 in terms of relation algebra. Before it will be done, in the
following section we present the relation-algebraic notions that we need for the realization of
this task.
3 Relation-algebraic Preliminaries
In this section, we ﬁrst recall the basics of relation algebra. Next, we introduce some further
relation constructions which are used in the remainder of the paper. For more details on relations
and relation algebra, see, e.g., Schmidt and Str¨ ohlein (1993, [40]) or Brink et al. (1997, [10]).
3.1 Relation Algebra
If X and Y are sets, then a subset R of the Cartesian product X Y is called a (binary) relation
with domain X and range Y . We denote the set (in this context also called type) of all relations








































9Relation Algebra and Simple Games 7
Y are ﬁnite sets of size m and n, respectively, then we may consider a relation R : X  Y as a
Boolean matrix with m rows and n columns. The Boolean matrix interpretation of relations is
well suited for many purposes and also used as one of the graphical representations of relations
within the RelView tool. Therefore, in this paper we often use Boolean matrix terminology
and notation. In particular, we speak of rows, columns and entries of relations and write Rx,y
instead of  x,y  R or xRy to express that x and y are related via R.
In the present paper we use the following basic operations of relation algebra: RT (trans-
position), R (complement), R   S (union), R   S (intersection) and RS (composition). As
special relations we use O (empty relation), L (universal relation), and I (identity relation). If R
is included in S we write R   S and equality of R and S is denoted as R = S. We assume the
reader to be familiar with the component-wise descriptions of these notions, e.g., that, given
R : X  Y , x   X and y   Y , it holds RT
x,y if and only if Ry,x and R x,y if and only if ¬Ry,x.
3.2 Modelling of Sets
Relation algebra o ers some simple and elegant ways to model subsets of a given set or, equiva-
lently, predicates on this set. In this paper we will use vectors, is-element relations and injective
mappings for this task.
A vector v is a relation v with v = vL. As for a vector, therefore, the range is irrelevant,
we consider in the following mostly vectors v : X  1 with a speciﬁc singleton set 1 := { } as
range and omit in such cases the second subscript, i.e., write vx instead of vx, . Analogously
to linear algebra we will use lower-case letters to denote vectors. A vector v : X  1 can be
considered as a Boolean matrix with exactly one column, i.e., as a Boolean column vector, and
represents (or: is a representation of) the subset {x   X | vx} of X. A non-empty vector v is
a point if vvT   I, i.e., it is injective. This means that it represents a singleton subset of its
domain or an element from it if we identify a set {x} with the element x. In the matrix model,
hence, a point v : X  1 is a Boolean column vector in which exactly one entry is 1.
Given y   Y , with R(y) we denote the y-column of the relation R : X  Y . That is, R(y)
has type [X  1] and for all x   X are R
(y)
x and Rx,y equivalent. To compare the columns of
two relations R and S with the same domain X and possible di erent ranges Y and Y  , we use
the symmetric quotient
syq(R,S) := RT S   R
T
S (5)
of them. The type of syq(R,S) is [Y  Y  ], and transforming (5) into a component-wise notation
we have for all y   Y and y    Y   that syq(R,S)y,y  if and only if R(y) = S(y ), i.e., if and only
if for all x   X the relationships Rx,y and Sx,y  are equivalent.
As a second way to deal with sets we will apply the relation-level equivalents of the set-
theoretic symbol  , that is, is-element relations E : X  2X between X and its powerset
2X. These speciﬁc relations are deﬁned by demanding for all elements x   X and sets Y  
2X that Ex,Y if and only if x   Y . A simple Boolean matrix implementation of is-element
relations requires an exponential number of bits. However, in Leoniuk (2001, [25]) an ingenious
implementation of E : X  2X using reduced ordered binary decision diagrams (ROBDDs) is
developed, where the number of BDD-vertices is linear in the size of the base set X. This
implementation is part of RelView.
Finally, we will use injective mappings for modeling sets. Given an injective function ı :
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it with its image under ı. If Y is actually a subset of X and ı is given as a relation of type
[Y  X] such that ıy,x if and only if y = x for all y   Y and x   X, then the vector ıTL : X  1
represents Y as a subset of X in the sense above. Clearly, the transition in the other direction
is also possible, i.e., the generation of a relation inj(v):Y  X from the vector representation
v : X  1 of the subset Y of X such that for all y   Y and x   X we have inj(v)y,x if and
only if y = x. We obtain inj(v) by removing from I : X  X all rows which correspond to a
0-entry in v. The relation inj(v) is an injective mapping in the relation-algebraic sense; see,
e.g., Section 4.2 of Schmidt and Str¨ ohlein (1993, [40]). A combination of such relations with
is-element relations allows a column-wise representation of sets of subsets. More speciﬁcally,
if the vector v :2 X  1 represents a subset S of 2X in the sense above, i.e., S equals the set
{Y   2X | vY }, then for all x   X and Y  S we get the equivalence of (Einj(v)
T)x,Y and
x   Y . This means, that the elements of S are represented precisely by the columns of the
relation M := Einj(v)
T : X  S since for all Y  S it holds Y = {x   X | M
(Y )
x }.
3.3 Cartesian Products and Applications
Given a Cartesian product X  Y of two sets X and Y , there are the two canonical projection
functions which decompose a pair1 u =  u1,u 2  into its ﬁrst component u1 and its second
component u2. For a relation-algebraic approach it is useful to consider instead of these functions
the corresponding projection relations   : X Y  X and   : X Y  Y such that for all
u   X   Y , x   X and y   Y we have  u,x if and only if u1 = x and  u,y if and only if
u2 = y. Projection relations enable us to specify the well-known pairing operation of functional
programming relation-algebraically as follows: For relations R : Z  X and S : Z  Y we deﬁne
their pairing (frequently also called fork or tupling)[ R,S]:Z  X Y by
[R,S] := R 
T   S 
T. (6)
Using (6), for all z   Z and u   X   Y a simple reﬂection shows that [R,S]z,u if and only if
Rz,u1 and Sz,u2. As a consequence, the exchange relation
X := [ , ]=  
T     
T (7)
of type [X Y  Y  X] exchanges the components of a pair. This means that for all u   X  Y
and v   Y   X the relationship Xu,v holds if and only if u1 = v2 and u2 = v1.
By a combination of the constructions introduced so far, a lot of the well-known operations
and predicates on sets can be speciﬁed as relations. In the present paper, we need the following:
M := syq([E,E],E) R := syq([I,E],E) C := syq(E, E)
J := syq([E, E],E) A := syq([I, E],E) S := ET E
(8)
The relations M and J have type [2X 2X  2X] and relation-algebraically specify set intersec-
tion and set union, respectively, since for all  S,T  2X 2X and U   2X it holds M S,T ,U if and
only if S   T = U and J S,T ,U if and only if S   T = U. The type of R and A is [X 2X  2X],
and these relations specify the removal and addition of elements, respectively. The latter means









































9Relation Algebra and Simple Games 9
that for all  x,T  X 2X and U   2X it holds R x,T ,U if and only if T \{x} = U and A x,T ,U
if and only if T  {x} = U. Finally, C and S have type [2X  2X] and for all S,T   2X it holds
CS,T if and only if T = S and SS,T if and only if S   T. Hence, C speciﬁes set complementation
S    S := X \ S and S speciﬁes the subset order. To demonstrate how the relation-algebraic
speciﬁcations of (8) formally can be developed, we consider the most complicated case of set
union. Assume  S,T  2X 2X and U   2X. Then we have
S   T = U     x   X :( x   S   x   T)   x   U
    x   X : ¬(x/   S   x/   T)   x   U
    x   X : ¬(E x,S   E x,T)   Ex,U
    x   X : [E, E] x, S,T    Ex,U
   syq([E, E],E) S,T ,U,
and the deﬁnition of the relation J in (8) shows the desired result.
We end this section with the following two functions (in the usual mathematical sense)
which establish a Boolean lattice isomorphism between the two Boolean lattices [X  Y ] and
[X Y  1]. In the following equations   : X Y  X and   : X Y  Y are the projection
relations of the underlying Cartesian product and L is a universal vector of type [Y  1].
vec(R)=(  R    )L rel(v)= 
T(    vL
T) (9)
The function vec deﬁnes the vector vec(R) corresponding to the relation R, and the inverse
function rel deﬁnes the relation rel(v) corresponding to the vector v. Using a component-wise
notation, these deﬁnitions say that for all x   X and y   Y we have Rx,y if and only if
vec(R) x,y  and v x,y  if and only if rel(v)x,y.
4 Investigating Simple Games with Relation Algebra
In this section, ﬁrst we introduce two relation-algebraic models of simple games and show
how each of them can be transformed into the other one. Based on the vector model, we
then demonstrate how to specify important notions of simple games in the language of relation
algebra. All speciﬁcations will be algorithmic since they either are relation-algebraic expressions
or inclusions respectively equations between such expressions. Hence, they can be executed with
the help of RelView after a simple translation into the programming language of this tool.
4.1 Relation-Algebraic Models of Simple Games
A ﬁrst possibility to model a simple game (N,W) with relation-algebraic means is to use a vector
v :2 N  1 that represents the set W as subset of 2N in the sense of Section 3.2. Frequently, v
is called the characteristic vector of the game; in our context we call it the vector model. Given
such a model v, from Section 3.2 we already know that then the columns M(S),S W, of the
relation M := Einj(v)
T : N  W precisely represent all winning coalitions. Hence, the game
(N,W) can also be modeled by the relation M. Since M speciﬁes membership of players in
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The deﬁnition of M shows how to transform the vector model into the membership model.
We formulate this once again as ﬁrst part of the following theorem, where E is the is-element
relation between players and coalitions. In the second part of the theorem we show how to
obtain the vector model back from the membership model.
Theorem 4.1.1 Let (N,W) be a simple game. If v :2 N  1 is the game’s vector model,
then Einj(v)
T : N  W is its membership model. Conversely, if M : N  W is the game’s
membership model, then syq(E,M)L :2 N  1 (with L : W 1) is its vector model.
Proof: By construction, we have syq(E,M) : 2N  W. Now, for all S   2N we get
(syq(E,M)L)S     T  W : syq(E,M)S,T   LT
    T  W :  k   N : Ek,S   Mk,T
    T  W :  k   N : k   S   k   T
    T  W : S = T
   S  W,
and this property shows that the vector syq(E,M)L represents W as subset of 2N, as required
for the vector model of the game.  
Since the columns of the membership model M of (N,W) enumerate the winning coalitions,
with regard to the use of RelView the relation M is appropriate for input and output. Which
coalitions are winning hardly can be seen from the vector model v. However, as experience has
shown, the great advantage of the vector model is that it enables in many cases much more
elegant relation-algebraic speciﬁcations than the membership model. This holds in particular if
a task requires to treat coalitions which are non-winning. For S   2N in the vector model the
property S/  W is simple expressed by v S, whereas in the membership model, for instance, it
may require to consider the vector representation s : N  1 of S and to verify syq(M,s)=O.
Speciﬁcations based on the vector model are frequently even more e cient than membership-
based ones. This is especially the case if a high percentage of coalitions is winning, since then in
the membership model a lot of columns occur. That almost half of the coalitions are winning is
typical in practice. E.g., using data from van Deemen (1989, [12]), van Roozendaal (1990, [34])
and Berghammer et al. (2009, [8]), with the help ofRelView we obtained for Dutch parliaments
that from the 8192 possible coalitions of the 13-parties parliament after the 1972 election 3999
(48.8%) are winning, from the 1024 possible coalitions of the present 10-parties parliament 505
(49.3%) are winning and from the 64 possible coalitions of the 6-parties parliament after the
1986 election even 32 (50%) are winning. However, it should be mentioned here, too, that in
cases of speciﬁc problems on simple games with larger sets of players but rather small sets of
winning coalitions (caused by additional restrictions like connectedness wrt. a policy order or an
additional ‘accepts a coalition with’ relation on the set of players) frequently the membership
model allows more e cient solutions than the vector model.
Due to lack of space, apart from the visualization of input and output, in the remainder
of the paper we restrict us to the vector model and postpone the presentation of the results
concerning the membership model to a future paper. In the next theorem we give ﬁrst examples
for relation-algebraic speciﬁcations of game-theoretic notions that base on the vector model. In








































9Relation Algebra and Simple Games 11
Theorem 4.1.2 Assume v :2 N  1 to be the vector model of a simple game (N,W). Then
(N,W) is monotone if and only if Sv   v and is a voting game if and only if in addition
v  = O and v   ETL.
Proof: That Sv   v speciﬁes monotonicity follows from
Sv   v     S   2N :( Sv )S   v S
    S   2N :(  T   2N : SS,T   v T)   v S
    S,T   2N : S   T   T/   W   S/  W
    S,T   2N : S   T   S   W   T  W.
The equivalence of v  = O and W =   is trivial and the remaining claim is shown by
v   ETL     S   2N : vS   k   N : ET
S,k   Lk
    S   2N : S   W    k   N : k   S
    S   2N : S   W   S  =  .  
In the next theorem we relation-algebraically specify the properties of a simple game of being
proper and strong. Here C :2 N  2N is the relation for set complementation; cf. (8).
Theorem 4.1.3 Given v :2 N  1 as the vector model of a simple game (N,W), the game is
proper if and only if v   Cv and the game is strong if and only if v   Cv.
Proof: Starting with a formal logical speciﬁcation of being a proper game, the ﬁrst claim is
shown by the calculation
 S   2N : S   W   S/   W     S   2N : S   W    T   2N : T = S   T/  W
    S   2N : vS   T   2N : CS,T   v T
   v   Cv.
In the same way the second speciﬁcation can be calculated.  
Since C is a mapping in the relation-algebraic sense, we get due to Schmidt and Str¨ ohlein (1993,
[40]) that v   Cv if and only if Cv = Cv   v. Hence, the simple game is decisive (i.e., proper
and strong) if and only if v = Cv if and only if v = Cv.
Also for weighted majority games a vector model v :2 N  1 can be computed within relation
algebra. To this end, the players are interpreted as the parties of a parliament and the weights
are interpreted as the number of the parliament seats the party holds, i.e., in the very same
way as in real political life. Then the only requirement to obtain v is that, given X as set of
seats, there is a mapping (in the relation-algebraic sense) D : X  N at hand that describes
the distribution of the seats, i.e., fulﬁlls for all x   X and k   N that Dx,k if and only if seat x
is owned by party k. Since the concrete procedure is irrelevant for the remainder of the paper,
we don’t go into details here and refer the interested reader to Berghammer et al. (2009, [8]),
where the computation of v from D formally is developed.
In general, the number of winning coalitions of a simple game can grow rapidly with the
number of players. For example, if the game is proper and strong and n is the number of players,
then the number of winning coalitions is 2n 1, i.e., 50% of all coalitions are winning. Therefore,
in the following example that shall demonstrate the visualization facilities of RelView we deal
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Fig.1. Membership model of the Catalonian game
Example 4.1.1. We consider the following weighted majority game with ﬁve players, that is a
representation of the parliament of Catalonia, one of the 17 Spanish autonomous communities,
after the November 2003 election.
[68;46,42,23,15,9]
The players are, from left to right, labeled with the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5; they correspond
(in the same order) to the ﬁve Catalonian parties CIU, PSC-CPC, ERC, PP and ICV-EA. In
the picture of Figure 1 the membership model M : N  W of this game is shown as depicted
by RelView in the relation-window of its user interface. In this 5   16 Boolean matrix a
black square means a 1-entry and a white square means a 0-entry. So, for example, the winning
coalition represented by the ﬁrst column of M consists of the three parties PSC-CPC, ERC
and ICV-EA. If we transform the membership model M into the vector model, we obtain a
vector v :2 N  1 in which exactly 16 entries are 1. The two pictures of Figure 2 show the
is-element relation E : N  2N and, below it, the transpose of the vector v (that is, the row
vector vT : 1 2N). The 32 columns of the is-element relation E represent the 32 coalitions. A
comparison of the pictures (here the row vector representation of the game is of great advantage)
shows that the 1-entries of the vector model v precisely designate those columns of E that belong
to the membership model M.
As a weighted majority game, (N,W) is monotone. We also have tested whether it is proper
and strong using the RelView-versions
proper(E,v) = incl(v,Compl(E)*-v) stronc(E,v) = incl(-v,Compl(E)*v)
of the speciﬁcations of Theorem 4.1.3, where the pre-deﬁned RelView-operation incl tests
inclusion of relations and the RelView-function
Compl(E) = syq(-E,-E)
computes from the is-element relation E : N  2N the relation S :2 N  2N for set complemen-
tation. In both cases we obtained the answer ‘yes’.  








































9Relation Algebra and Simple Games 13
4.2 Computing Minimal Coalitions and Related Notions
Computing minimal winning coalitions with relation-algebraic means is easy. It is well-known,
cf. Schmidt and Str¨ ohlein (1993, [40]) that, given a strict order relation R : X  X and a vector
w : X  1 that represents a subset Y of X, the vector w   RTw : X  1 represents the set
of minimal elements of Y as a subset of X. Hence, if we take w as vector model v :2 N  1
of a simple game (N,W) and R as the irreﬂexive part of the subset order S :2 N  2N, we
immediately get the following result.
Theorem 4.2.1 If v :2 N  1 is the vector model of the simple game (N,W), then the vector
minwin(v) := v   (S   I)
Tv
of type [2N  1] represents the set Wmin of minimal winning coalitions.  
In the next theorem we relation-algebraically specify the is-swinger relation and, based on it, the
vector of vulnerable winning coalitions. To simplify the calculations, we only consider monotone
games. With regard to practical applications this is no serious restriction.2 Recall from Section
3, that R is the relation-algebraic speciﬁcation of element-removal and the function rel yields
for a vector that represents a subset of a Cartesian product in the sense of Section 3.2 the
corresponding ‘proper’ relation.
Theorem 4.2.2 Let v :2 N  1 be the vector model of a monotone simple game (N,W). If we
deﬁne the relation Swingers(v):N  2N and the vector vulwin(v) : 2N  1 by
Swingers(v) := E   Lv
T   rel(Rv) vulwin(v) := Swingers(v)
TL
(with L : N  1), then for all k   N and S   2N it holds Swingers(v)k,S if and only if k is a
swinger of S and vulwin(v)S if and only if S is a vulnerable winning coalition.
Proof: For all k   N and S   2N we have
Swingers(v)k,S    (E   LvT   rel(Rv))k,S
   Ek,S   (LvT)k,S   rel(Rv)k,S
   Ek,S   (LvT)k,S   (Rv) k,S 
   Ek,S   (LvT)k,S   T   2N : R k,S ,T   v T
   Ek,S   vS   T   2N : S \{ k} = T   v T
   Ek,S   vS   v S\{k}
   k   S   S   W   S \{ k} /  W.
Since (N,W) is monotone, the last formula speciﬁes k as a swinger of S. This is the ﬁrst result.
Using it, the second one is shown by
vulwin(v)S    (Swingers(v)
TL)S
    k   N : Swingers(v)
T
S,k   Lk
    k   N : k   S   S   W   S \{ k} /  W
   S   W    k   N : k   S   S \{ k} /  W.  
2 In the political science literature typically one only considers monotone simple games as, e.g., in Peleg (1981, [31]),
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So far, we have considered speciﬁc kinds of coalitions. In the remainder of the section, we turn
towards speciﬁc players with more or less power such as a dummy,avetoer,adictator, and a
null player. The next theorem shows how the sets of these speciﬁc players relation-algebraically
can be speciﬁed as vectors. It uses the relation A of (8) for the addition of an element.
Theorem 4.2.3 Based on the vector model v :2 N  1 of a simple game and m := minwin(v)
as vector representation of the set Wmin of minimal winning coalitions, we consider the following
four vectors of type [N  1] (where [N  N] is the type of the I in syq(I,E) and [2N  2N] is
the type of the I in Im):
dummy(m) := Em vetoer(m) := Em
dictator(m) := syq(I,E)(m   Im) null(v) := syq(rel(Av)
T,v)
Then dummy(m) (vetoer(m), dictator(m) and null(v), respectively) represents the set of dum-
mies (vetoers, dictators and null players, respectively).
Proof: We only verify the speciﬁcations for dictators and null players. Assume k   N. Then
the ﬁrst case follows from
dictator(m)k    (syq(I,E)(m   Im))k
    S   2N : syq(I,E)k,S   mS   Im S
    S   2N :(  j   N : Ij,k   Ej,S)   mS   ¬ T  W : I S,T   mT
    S   2N :(  j   N : j = k   j   S)   mS   T  W : mT   S = T
    S   2N : S = {k}  S  Wmin   T  Wmin : S = T
and the second case follows from
null(v)k    syq(rel(Av)
T,v)k
    S   2N : rel(Av)
T
S,k   vS
    S   2N :( Av) k,S    vS
    S   2N :(  T   2N : A k,S ,T   vT)   vS
    S   2N :(  T   2N : S  {k} = T   T  W)   S  W
    S   2N : S  {k}   W   S  W,
since in both cases the last formula of the derivation is the formal logical speciﬁcation of the
property under consideration.  
In a simple game at most one dictator can exist. Hence, if dictator(m) is not empty, then this
vector is a point in the sense of Section 3.2. Using the above speciﬁcations, it immediately
can be tested whether a simple game is weak or dictatorial, respectively, since, translated into
relation algebra, the ﬁrst property means that vetoer(m)  = O and the second property means
that dictator(m)  = O.
Finally, let us consider what the RelView-programs corresponding to the speciﬁcations of
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Fig.3. Vulnerable and minimal winning coalitions of the Catalonian game
Example 4.2.1. If the RelView-programs we have obtained from the relation-algebraic spec-
iﬁcations vulwin(v) and minwin(v) of Theorem 4.2.2 and Theorem 4.2.13 are applied to the
vector model of Example 4.1.1, then the tool yields two vectors which, again in transposed
form to save space, are shown in the two pictures of Figure 3. The row vector on the top
designates the 13 vulnerable winning coalitions of the parliament of Catalonia after the 2003
election, and that under it designates the ﬁve minimal winning coalitions. From these results
we could obtain the ‘concrete’ form of the coalitions by a comparison with the columns of the
is-element relation E : N  2N as remarked in Example 4.1.1. The much more easier way is,
however, to use the technique for the column-wise enumeration of sets presented in Section 3.2,
i.e., to evaluate the two expressions Evulwin(v)
T and Eminwin(v)
T. Doing so, we obtain the
left-most and right-most of the three RelView-matrices of Figure 4, from which each vulner-
able winning coalition and each minimal winning coalition, respectively, immediately can be
obtained as a column.
The RelView-matrix in the middle column-wisely enumerates the sets of swingers of
the vulnerable winning coalitions. It is obtained by removing from the is-swinger relation all
columns corresponding to a 0-entry in the vector representation of the vulnerable winning
coalitions. Relation-algebraically this reads as Swingers(v)inj(vulwin(v))
T.
To explain the three RelView-matrices of Figure 4 a bit more, we compare the ﬁrst columns
of the two 5   13 matrices. Since they are identical, that means, each party is a swinger, the
represented coalition {PSC-CPC,ERC,ICV-EA} is a minimal winning one. This agrees with
the column-wise enumeration of these coalitions in which the coalition appears, too. Next,
we compare the third columns of the two matrices. From the ﬁrst matrix we get {PSC-
CPC,ERC,PP,ICV-EA} as vulnerable winning coalition and from the second one {PSC-
CPC,ERC} as the set of its swingers. Hence, this coalition is not minimal winning. Again
this agrees with the right-most matrix, since now the coalition does not occur as a column.
To demonstrate RelView’s visualization potential a bit more, the RelView-graph of
Figure 5 shows the Hasse-diagram of the inclusion order S of the 32 coalitions of our example.
In this picture the inclusion relationships between the 16 winning coalitions are highlightened
by boldface arcs; from this it immediately becomes clear that the game is monotone. The
ﬁve minimal winning coalitions are drawn as white squares and the 11 non-minimal winning
coalitions are drawn as black circles.
3 Since the is-swinger relation is very decisive for computing power indices, we postpone its presentation until Section
4.4. That section is devoted to the computation of power indices.
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Fig.5. The ordered coalitions of the Catalonian game
For our running example we also have computed the vectors speciﬁed in Theorem 4.2.3.
Here all results the RelView tool delivered were empty.  
4.3 Computing Central and Dominant Players
In this section we deliver relation-algebraic speciﬁcations of the sets of central and dominant
players. Let us start with the concept of a central player. Note that since there exists at most
one central player in a simple game, the vector given in the following theorem either is empty
or is a point in the sense of Section 3.2.
Theorem 4.3.1 Let a simple game (N,W) with a policy order P : N  N be given and assume
that v :2 N  1 is the game’s vector model. Then the vector
central(v,P) := syq(P,E)v   syq(P T,E)v   syq(P   I,E)v   syq(P
T   I,E)v
of type [N  1] (where I : N  N) represents the set of central players.
Proof: Let k   N be a player. Then we have
syq(P,E)v k    ¬ S   2N : syq(P,E)k,S   vS
    S   2N :(  j   N : Pj,k   Ej,S)   v S
    S   2N :(  j   N : Pj,k   j   S)   v S
    S   2N : S = {j   N : Pj,k}  S/  W








































9Relation Algebra and Simple Games 17
and a replacement of P by its transpose in this calculation shows
syq(P T,E)v    {j   N : Pk,j} /  W.
Next, we deal with the third expression of the intersection and get
(syq(P   I,E)v)k     S   2N : syq(P   I,E)k,S   vS
    S   2N :(  j   N :( Pj,k   Ij,k)   Ej,S)   vS
    S   2N :(  j   N :( Pj,k   j = k)   j   S)   vS
    S   2N : S = {j   N : Pj,k}   {k}  S  W
   {j   N : Pj,k}   {k}   W.
Again by a replacement of P by P T we ﬁnd for the fourth expression
(syq(P
T   I,E)v)k    {j   N : Pk,j}   {k}   W.
Finally, the conjunction of the right-hand sides of the derived equivalences precisely means that
k is a central player.  
Next, let us study the concept of a dominant player. In the following, we show how two desir-
ability concepts introduced in Peleg (1981, [31]) relation-algebraically can be speciﬁed. We do
it again in such a way that this leads to RelView-programs after a simple translation step.
In the decisive ﬁrst part of the following theorem it is shown how the concept ‘as-least-as-
desirable’ relation-algebraically can be speciﬁed by means of a vector with a Cartesian product
as domain. The – again vector-based – speciﬁcations of ‘more-desirable’ and ‘dominance’ then
are easy consequences of the theorem’s ﬁrst part. Recall from Section 3, that J and R are the
relation-algebraic speciﬁcation of set union and element-removal, respectively, X is the relation
for exchanging the components of pairs, the function rel transforms vector representations into
‘proper’ relations and the function vec is the inverse of rel.
Theorem 4.3.2 Let v :2 N  1 be the vector model of a simple game (N,W). Then the vector
alades(v) := L([ETE, ETE]   [rel(Jv),rel(Jv)])
of type [2N 2N  1] (where L : 1 2N) represents the at-least-as-desirable relation  D as
subset of 2N 2N. For the more-desirable relation >D the same is obtained by the vector
mdes(v) := alades(v)   Xalades(v)
of type [2N 2N  1]. With   : N 2N  N as ﬁrst projection of N 2N, ﬁnally, the vector
dom(v) := vec(E)   [  syq(I,E),R]mdes(v)
of type [N 2N  1] represents the dominance relation   as subset of N 2N.
Proof: Let a pair  S,T  2N 2N be given. We start with the following equivalence:
alades(v) S,T     L([ETE, ETE]   [rel(Jv),rel(Jv)])  S,T 
   ¬ U   2N : L .U   [ETE, ETE]U, S,T    [rel(Jv),rel(Jv)]U, S,T 
   ¬ U   2N : ETE U,S   ETE U,T   rel(Jv)U,S   rel(Jv)U,T
   ¬ U   2N : ETE U,S   ETE U,T   (Jv) U,S    (Jv) U,T 
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Now, we consider the four relationships of the body of the universal quantiﬁcation. In the ﬁrst
case we calculate
ETE U,S    ¬ j   N : E
T
U,j   Ej,S    ¬ j   N : j   U   j   S    U   S =  .
In the same way we get the equivalence of the relationship ETE U,T and U   T =  . For the
third relationship we obtain
(Jv) U,T      V   2N : J U,T ,V   vV
    V   2N : U   T = V   V  W
   U   T  W.
A similar calculation shows that (Jv) U,S  if and only if U   S/  W. Summing up, we have
shown the equivalence
alades(v) S,T      U   2
N : U   S =   U   T =   U   T   W   U   S  W,
the right-hand side of which is the formal logical speciﬁcation of the relationship S  D T and,
thus, concludes the proof of the ﬁrst claim.
To verify the second claim we assume again a pair  S,T  2N 2N to be given. Then the
desired result is shown by the following derivation, since the last line of it is the formal logical
speciﬁcation of S> D T:
mdes(v) S,T     (alades(v)   Xalades(v))  S,T 
   alades(v) S,T    Xalades(v)  S,T 
   S  D T   ¬  U,V   2N 2N : X S,T , U,V     alades(v) U,V  
   S  D T   ¬  U,V   2N 2N : S = V   T = U   alades(v) U,V  
   S  D T  ¬alades(v) T,S 
   S  D T  ¬(T  D S)
Finally, the last claim is shown by the following calculation for all pairs  k,S  N 2N,
which uses the equivalence of (syq(I,E)k,T and {k} = T and ends with the logical formula that
speciﬁes the relationship k   S:
dom(v) k,S     (vec(E)   [  syq(I,E),R]mdes(v)) k,S 
   vec(E) k,S    ([  syq(I,E),R]mdes(v)) k,S 
   Ek,S     T,U  2N 2N :[  syq(I,E),R] k,S , T,U    mdes(v) T,U 
   k   S     T,U  2N 2N : (syq(I,E)k,T   R k,S ,U   T> D U
   k   S     T,U  2N 2N : {k} = T   S \{ k} = U   T> D U
   k   S  {k} >D S \{ k}  
If we apply the function rel of (9) to the three vectors of Theorem 4.3.2, then we obtain again
relation-algebraic speciﬁcations rel(alades(v)), rel(mdes(v)) and rel(dom(v)) for the relations
 D, >D and  , respectively, but now as ‘proper’ relations of type [2N  2N] in the ﬁrst two
cases and [N  2N] in the latter case. The RelView-versions of rel(alades(v)) and rel(mdes(v))
allow to visualize the at-least-as-desirable and the more-desirable relation of a simple game
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Fig.6. The more-desirable relation of the Catalonian game
As we have already demonstrated, in the latter case additionally features are provided which
allow to draw graphs nicely and to highlight selected portions. The speciﬁcation rel(dom(v)) at
once leads to a RelView-program for determining the game’s dominant players. Recall that
the dominant players are those which are related to an element of W via the dominance relation
 . Taking v as vector representation of W and rel(dom(v)) as relation-algebraic speciﬁcation of
 , this immediately yields rel(dom(v))v : N  1 as vector representation of the set of dominant
players of the game.
Example 4.3.1. Unfortunately, nowhere in the literature a policy order of the parties of our
running example seems to have been published. Therefore, in the following we only demonstrate
how RelView can be used to treat the concepts of ‘desirability’ and ‘dominance’.
In the RelView-picture of Figure 6 we show the Hasse-diagram of the more-desirable re-
lation rel(mdes(v)) of the parliament of Catalonia after the 2003 election. The directed graph
is drawn using the level-oriented graph-drawing algorithm of Gansner et al. (1993, [18]). From
the level at the top we get that half of the coalitions is maximal with respect to ‘more-
desirability’ and these coalitions coincide with the winning ones (since the row vector rep-
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Fig.7. The dominance relation of the Catalonian game
labels 14-16 or labels 20-32 represent winning coalitions). In case of the dominance-relation
rel(dom(v)) : N  2N, the RelView tool delivers the 5   32 Boolean matrix of Figure 7. It
shows that party CIU (row number 1 in the matrix) is the only dominant player of the par-
liament because it dominates the three winning coalitions with column labels 20, 21 and 25.
Recall from the RelView-picture of the vector model in Example 4.1.1 that the coalitions with
column labels 17-19 and the coalitions dominated by the other parties are not winning.  
4.4 Computing Power Indices
In this section we apply relation algebra to some power indices. More precisely, we present
relation-algebraic speciﬁcations of the Banzhaf, Holler-Packel, and Deegan-Packel indices.
There is a very close relationship between the relation Swingers(v):N  2N of Theorem
4.2.2 and the power indices introduced in (2) and (3) that also is the key for their computa-
tion using the RelView tool. This relationship is presented in the next theorem. To enhance
readability, in it we denote for X and Y being ﬁnite, for R : X  Y and x   X, the number
of 1-entries of R with |R| and the number of 1-entries of the x-row of R with |R|x. Hence, |R|
equals the cardinality of R (as set of pairs) and |R|x equals the cardinality of the subset Y   of
Y that is represented by the transpose of the x-row, i.e. by the vector (R(x))T : Y  1, in the
sense of Section 3.2.
Theorem 4.4.1 Assume a monotone simple game (N,W) with n players and its vector model
v :2 N  1. Furthermore, let a player k   N be given. Then we have for the Banzhaf index that
(i) B(k)=
|Swingers(v)|k
2n 1 (ii) B(k)=
|Swingers(v)|k
|Swingers(v)|








Proof: Equation (i) is trivial since the transpose of the k-row of Swingers(v) represents the set















which is (ii). Equation (iii) is again trivial and (iv) is shown analogously to (ii).  
If the RelView tool depicts a relation R as Boolean matrix in the relation-window, then in the
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Fig.8. The is-swinger relation of the Catalonian game
rows and columns for explanatory purposes. So far, we only have shown the possibility to attach
consecutive row and/or column numbers. But also the numbers of 1-entries can be attached as
labels. In combination with Theorem 4.4.1 this immediately allows to compute Banzhaf and
Holler-Packel indices. We demonstrate this by means of our running example.
Example 4.4.1. If we use RelView to compute the is-swinger relation Swingers(v) for the
vector model v of our running Catalonia parliament example and additionally instruct the tool
to attach consecutive row and column numbers, and for each row also the number of its 1-
entries as second label (after the sign ‘/’), we get the picture of Figure 8. From the second row
labels 10,6,6,2,2 and the fact that there are exactly 26 1-entries, we immediately obtain the







If in these fractions the denominators 26 are changed to 25 1 = 16, then the results are the
parties’ absolute Banzhaf indices.
Next, we evaluate the expression Swingers(minwin(v)). Then RelView depicts the labeled
Boolean matrix of Figure 9 on its screen. Hence, the normalized Holler-Packel indices of the







In Example 4.2.1 we have shown that there are ﬁve minimal winning coalitions. As a conse-
quence, a change of the denominators 13 to 5 yields the absolute Holler-Packel indices of the






The Shapley-Shubik index, the Deegan-Packel index and the Johnston index are three further
prominent power indices for measuring power in simple games. In contrast with the Banzhaf
index and the Holler-Packel index, their deﬁnitions use more arithmetic operations than (2)
and (3). As we will show in the next example by means of the Deegan-Packel index, in principle
relation algebra and RelView can also be applied here. But the example also clearly shows
the limit of the use of RelView in respect thereof.
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Fig.10. Relations for determining the Deegan-Packel indices
Example 4.4.2. To compute the Deegan-Packel index D(k) of a player k   N using relation
algebra and the RelView tool, we assume the vector representation m := minwin(v) of the
set Wmin of minimal winning coalitions to be at hand and the player k   N to be represented
by a point p : N  1 in the sense of Section 3.2. If E : N  2N is the is-element relation, then
a little reﬂection shows that the vector ETp :2 N  1 represents the set of all coalitions S   2N
such that k   S and, therefore, the relation




of type [N  W
(k)
min] column-wisely represents the set W
(k)
min used in (4) to deﬁne D(k). Based
on m and (10), now the Deegan-Packel index D(k) can be determined by performing one after
another the following three steps:
1. Compute for each column of Deegan(m,p) the reciprocal value of the number of its 1-entries.
2. Add all numbers obtained by the ﬁrst step.
3. Divide the result of the second step by the number of 1-entries of m.
In the case of our Catalonian parliament example, the RelView tool delivered the ﬁve relations
Deegan(m,p) which are depicted in Figure 10, where the point p represents (from left to right)
the ﬁve parties CIU, PSC-CPC, ERC, PP and ICV-EA. If we apply the above procedure, then































It is obvious that the calculations of Example 4.4.2 hardly can be done by hand if the number
of minimal winning coalitions is large. For instance, the situation becomes a good deal worse in
the case of the present 10-parties Dutch parliament, since here already 42 of the 505 winning
coalitions are minimal winning. To overcome the di culties caused by the restrictive program-
ming language of RelView,4 in the course of the Ph.D. thesis Milanese (2003, [27]) and the
M.Sc. thesis Szymanski (2003, [44]), the Kure library has been developed. It comprises the
core functionality of RelView and opens the possibility to integrate relation-algebraic com-
putations into C- and Java-programs. Particularly with regard to the above example, a use of
Kure allows to perform all the arithmetic computations we have done by hand automatically
by the superordinate C or Java-program.
4 Caused by the speciﬁc application domain of the tool, relations are the only pre-deﬁned datatype of this language and
all further datatypes have to be modeled via them. In particular, real numbers and their base operations do not exist
and it seems to be very di cult to model the reals in the same elegant and e cient way as, e.g., sets and a lot of
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5 Conclusion
We have presented two relation-algebraic models of simple games. For the vector model we have
developed executable relation-algebraic speciﬁcations for testing certain fundamental proper-
ties of simple games and for computing speciﬁc players, speciﬁc coalitions and some relations
between coalitions and between players and coalitions, respectively, which are important for
determining dominance and power indices. The resulting algorithms have been executed by
the BDD-based tool RelView after a straightforward translation into the tool’s programming
language for the example of the Catalonian parliament after the 2003 elections.
The algorithms we have used are expressed by extremely short and concise RelView-
programs. They are easy to alter in case of slightly changed speciﬁcations. Combining this
feature of the tool with its possibilities for visualization and stepwise execution of programs al-
lows the user to experiment and play with new concepts while avoiding unnecessary expenditure
of work. This makes the tool very useful for scientiﬁc research. Because of its visualization and
stepwise execution facilities RelView is also most suitable for educational purposes. Another
advantage of RelView is its implementation of relations via BDDs. Concerning e ciency it
proved to be superior to many other well-known implementations, like Boolean matrices, lists
of pairs and lists of successor/predecessor lists. This was especially of immense help for the
problems we have treated in this paper. Many problems on simple games are hard since they
require to compute or to check sets of exponential size and a lot of experiments have shown
that precisely this is a strength of the tool. The reader is e.g., referred to Berghammer et
al. (2002, [6]), Berghammer and Milanese (2006, [7]) and Berghammer and Fronk (2006, [4]),
where further examples of the potential of RelView in this regard are presented. Due to the
BDD-implementation, without any problems we have been able to apply our algorithms to a
lot of simple games that originate from real political life and are e.g., presented in Peleg (1981,
[31]), van Deemen (1989, [12]), and van Roozendaal (1990, [34]).
Of course, in spite of the fact that the system implements relations very e ciently, frequently
RelView-programs cannot compete with special programs tailored for problems of the kind
we have considered in Section 4 of the paper – although in the case of #P-complete or NP-hard
problems the complexities are usually the same. It is known that a number of problems around
simple games belong to these classes; see e.g., Prasad and Kelly (1990, [33]). We believe that the
real attraction of RelView lies in its ﬂexibility, its large application area, its computational
power when dealing with enumerations of huge sets of ‘interesting objects’ (e.g., to verify an
example or to construct a counter-example), its manifold animation and visualization possibil-
ities, and the concise form of its programs. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to compare the
competencies of the RelView tool with other game-theoretic algorithms such as the O(n·2
n
2)
algorithm for the Banzhaf index and the O(n2 · 2
n
2) algorithm for the Shapley-Shubik index
of weighted majority games presented in Klinz and Woeginger (2005, [22]) or the multilinear-
extension-based algorithms mentioned in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2008, [1]) and Lorenzo-Freire
et al. (2007, [26]).
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